Scott v Williams concerned s 15 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976. In situations of significant economic disparity post-separation, s 15 empowers courts to depart from the default rule of equal division of relationship property to compensate the disadvantaged partner. Causation is one of the jurisdictional hurdles. Only disparity "because of" the division of functions (DOF) is compensable. Thus far, courts have adopted a strict causation approach by placing a costly and often unattainable evidential burden on claimants. Consequently, compensation has been beyond reach for deserving claimants. Responding to this disquiet, Scott's majority propounded a "working assumption" of causation in relationships conducted along traditional lines, where one party assumes primary responsibility for domestic duties and the other for income-earning. In such situations, Scott's majority would assume causation at jurisdiction and attribute the entire disparity to the DOF when determining the quantum award. This essay concludes that the working assumption is a positive development in terms of jurisdiction. However, unlike the majority, it argues that striking the correct balance between s 15's "because of" wording and broad policy rationale, requires an apportionment of causes at quantum. Furthermore, the "traditional lines" and "non-career partner" terminology creates unnecessary confusion and should be eschewed.
I Introduction
Recently, the New Zealand Supreme Court in Scott v Williams 1 considered s 15 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 (PRA) 2 for the first time. All five judges delivered judgments on s 15.
The PRA's default rule of equal division of relationship property was progressive when introduced. 3 However, it soon became appreciated that this basis of "formal equality had failed somewhere, and that … substantive equality ought to be considered". 4 Section 15, enacted in the PRA's 2001 reform, reflects this. 5 It empowers courts to depart from equal division if satisfied that: 6 after the … relationship ends, [B's] income and living standards … are likely to be significantly higher than [A's] because of the effects of the division of functions [(DOF)] within the … relationship while the parties were living together.
A two-step analysis is required: jurisdiction (when an award can be made); and quantum (how much to award). One of the jurisdictional hurdles is causation. Only disparity because of the DOF is compensable. The DOF need not be the principal cause, 7 or even a real and substantive cause. 8 All jurisdiction requires is "a clear causal link"; 9 that the DOF is a cause of the disparity. 10 Nevertheless, many courts have adopted a strict M v B, above n 4, at [201] . 8 Atkin, above n 3, at 110. 9
X v X [Economic disparity] [2009] NZCA 399, [2010] 1 NZLR 601 at [108] . 10 Atkin, above n 3, at 110. Analysing the New Zealand Supreme Court's "Working Assumption": Is it Really Working? approach to causation. 11 Consequent difficulties in establishing causation were identified as a key reason 12 for widespread disappointment that s 15 "has not lived up to expectations". 13 Responding to this disquiet Scott's majority on causation (Arnold and Glazebrook JJ and Elias CJ) shifted from this strict approach and propounded a "working assumption" of causation in certain circumstances. This dictum was obiter as jurisdiction was conceded before the Supreme Court 14 but it will be highly persuasive. 15 Furthermore, causation is intertwined with quantum; an issue squarely before the Court.
Unfortunately, the judgments leave many unanswered questions. This essay proposes some answers while critically analysing whether the assumption is a positive development. It concludes that the assumption is a positive development in respect of the jurisdictional causation hurdle but argues that striking the correct balance between s 15's strict "because of" wording and broad policy rationale requires an apportionment of causes when determining compensable disparity at quantum. In this latter respect, it differs from Scott's majority. It also suggests that Scott's "traditional lines" and "noncareer partner" terminology should be eschewed. Therefore it argues for the proposition that, where A undertakes primary responsibility for domestic duties and B for incomeearning, there is an assumption that a causal link between the DOF and disparity exists. This is sufficient to satisfy the jurisdictional hurdle. The strength of this assumed causal link, as against other causes, should be apportioned and reflected in the quantum awarded. 6 Causation in Section 15 of the Property (Relationships) Act 1976 Analysing the New Zealand Supreme Court's "Working Assumption": Is it Really Working? This essay does not analyse all of s 15's elements, resolve problems created by its conceptual inconsistencies 16 and inadequate legislative process, 17 or comment on all aspects of Scott. Its specific focus is the working assumption. By unpacking the assumption and working through its rough edges, it aims to help readers understand this judicial innovation and suggests how it could be improved.
It must be noted that the New Zealand Law Commission (NZLC) is currently undertaking a PRA reform project. 18 Its Issues Paper, published two months before Scott, proposed three s 15 reform options. 19 Two options recommended repealing s 15. 20 However, until and unless legislative reform occurs, s 15 remains and Scott will have significant implications for such cases whether litigated or negotiated in the shadow of the law.
Furthermore, the NZLC's reform "Option 1" was to lower s 15's jurisdictional hurdles by, inter alia, replacing causation with a "rebuttable presumptive entitlement to compensation if there was financial inequality and a [DOF]". 21 As currently worded, s 15 requires causation. Unlike the NZLC, which is free to propose legislative reform, it would have been inappropriate for the Supreme Court to discard this requirement.
However, Scott's assumption and Option 1's presumptive entitlement are derived from similar concerns 22 and perform similar roles. 23 The NZLC is "looking with interest" at the assumption and its final recommendation may well align with Scott. 24 16 See Bill Atkin "Economic disparity -how did we end up with it? Has it been worth it?" (2007) 
II Deciphering the Working Assumption A Majority 1 When does it arise?
The majority agreed that a rebuttable assumption of causation arose in certain circumstances. What these circumstances are is unclear. There is support in all three judgments that causation is assumed if there was (1) significant disparity; and (2) a DOF. 25 However, the real tenor of Arnold J's judgment was his repeated reference to role-divisions "along traditional lines" when formulating the assumption. 26 On this formulation, causation is assumed if there was (1) significant disparity; (2) a DOF; and
(3) the DOF was along traditional lines. This distinction is worth grappling with as the question of what qualifies as "traditional" can create confusion. 27 Despite the uncertainty, it is likely Scott's assumption will be interpreted as requiring a relationship conducted along traditional lines ("traditional DOF relationship"). Arnold J provided the assumption's fullest exposition and his reasoning emphasised this requirement. 28 Glazebrook J 29 and Elias CJ 30 also provide some support for this formulation. Furthermore, in expressing their disagreement, the minority conceptualised the assumption as arising in traditional DOF relationships. 31 
A legal presumption
The "working assumption" terminology was likely used as a synonym for a legal presumption. Scott's language of rebutting, 35 negativing 36 and displacing 37 the assumption is evocative of other legal contexts containing rebuttable presumptions. 38
Glazebrook J further reinforced this by using the terms interchangeably. 39 Creating a rebuttable presumption has implications for matters of proof. Part V(C) explores these implications.
B Minority
Analysing O'Regan and William Young JJ's dissents require understanding the assumption's two-fold relevance to jurisdiction (assuming causation to satisfy the jurisdictional hurdle); and quantum (the extent of causation assumed in determining compensable disparity). Internationally, and in New Zealand, women take longer than men to recover economically post-separation. 61 International studies identify the traditional DOF between paid and unpaid work as contributing to this disparity 62 with one study concluding that "hours worked per week prior to separation can explain approximately 41
[per cent]" of the gender pay-gap post-separation. 63 Additionally extensive socioeconomic research suggests that marriage enhances male earning capacity. 64 The reason for this is that these men "are able to [earn more] by specialis[ing] in making money" without being burdened by domestic duties undertaken by their wives. 65 In New Zealand, despite increasing female workforce participation, men still spend significantly more time than women in paid employment, while women spend almost twice as much time than men on domestic work. 66 Thus to the extent that these international studies can be transposed in a New Zealand context, the statistics suggest assumptions (b) and (c) are valid.
One could criticise relying on this research as it primarily speaks in the context of a Furthermore, validating the working assumption based on underlying assumptions of restricted (or diminished), and enhanced, earning capacity may appear incongruous given the Supreme Court criticised the "diminution" and "enhancement" categories at quantum. 73 The criticism was that these categories lead to awards compensating A's loss, or redistributing B's enhancement, without compensating for relative disparity as s 15 requires. 74 However in validating what underlies the assumption of causation, this essay, like the majority, uses the "restricted" and "enhancement" terminology. 75 This provides a useful mechanism to understand why causation can be assumed as disparity caused by the 68 Susan St John "Income expectations of men and women after separation" (paper presented to the Family Law Conference, Wellington, October 1995) at 23 as cited in Atkin, above n 3, at 101. 69 CEF Rickett "The Classification of Trusts" (1999) longer turns on precise diminution or enhancement amounts.
IV The Impetus for the Working Assumption
Before Scott, "a few cases" took a broad approach to causation using reasoning similar to Scott's majority. 76 However, a strict approach was "usually" adopted 77 imposing a high evidential burden on A by emphasising a "but for" causal link 78 These statistics may partly be explained by unmeritorious cases where disparities were caused by non-function related causes. However, analysis of past case law suggests that deserving claimants have been barred by the strict, "unrealistically narrow approach". 86
These cases provide the impetus for the assumption. As a general criticism, the strict approach incentivises speculative, costly and unedifying evidence to be led. 87 This essay identifies and explores two specific categories that illustrate these general issues and pose policy issues of their own. As later argued, the assumption's ability to provide a solution makes it a positive development. 88
A First Problematic Category
The strict approach is problematic where A "ha[s no] serious career prospects at all" either because: (1) A's work before the DOF was low-skilled; or (2) PEL also illustrates the problematic 'all or nothing' mentality created by strict causation.
As later discussed, strict causation goes hand in hand with X v X's quantum methodology that quantifies compensation based on the differential between A's actual and "but for" income. 103 If "but for" income determines compensation, A is incentivised to pitch her "but for" income as high as possible and sometimes unrealistically so. In trying for it 'all', A often ends up with 'nothing' even though 'something' was deserved. For For claimants like CRH, the strict approach requiring evidence of a "but for" income works an injustice. 108 Nathan v Nathan said a lack of pre-relationship "qualifications or employment history … does not disqualify" A's claim. 109 However, it is difficult to see A succeeding under strict causation. There is no "but for" abandoned career to point to and courts have been unwilling "to speculate" in such circumstances. 110 Thus a lack of prerelationship employment is disqualifying in reality, albeit not legally. 113 Yet the strict approach deprives such claimants.
Furthermore, the strict approach's reluctance to find causation in enhancement claims, discussed below, exacerbates such claimants' vulnerabilities. 114 
B Second Problematic Category
Commentators have criticised courts for overlooking enhancement claims. 115 Analysis of past cases indicates that the rarity of successful enhancement claims is largely attributable to a reluctance to find causation, and quantification difficulties. 116 Analysing the New Zealand Supreme Court's "Working 120 Adducing such evidence often requires costly expert witnesses to substitute numerical values for A's non-financial contributions. Even then, success is not guaranteed as even experts struggle to find foundations for their figures. For example, in Scott an expert gave evidence that the DOF enhanced Williams' annual income by $50,000 but accepted in cross-examination that this was merely a "judgement". 121 The High Court 122 and Court of Appeal 123 rejected causation on the enhancement claim due to this lack of evidential foundation. This is problematic because research and common sense indicate that by undertaking domestic duties, A frees B to specialise in money making. 124 However, absent evidence of the degree or amount of enhancement, A's role is characterised as "merely permissive" Analysing the New Zealand Supreme Court's "Working Assumption": Is it Really Working? rather than "truly causative". 125 This is so even where A undertook day-to-day childcare, while B worked long hours, took unscheduled trips and spent 70 days a year overseas. 126 Similarly in CRH, GDH's earning capacity was attributed to the "very long hours" he worked. 127 When one remembers that the parties married young when CRH fell pregnant, consequently having two more children, then surely at least part of the reason why GDH could work long hours was because CRH undertook childcare. This is especially pertinent as both parties entered the relationship with no qualifications. GDH undertook an apprenticeship during the marriage, working as an electrician thereafter. 128 Ostensibly CRH could have completed the same apprenticeship, done the same work and had a similar earning capacity if she did not have to undertake full-time domestic duties.
Additionally, "problematic dicta" concerning the "nanny argument" have emerged from the "but for" test's application. 129 The "but for" focus allows the argument that the DOF Green, above n 59, at 309. 133 Henaghan, above n 115, at 101. 134
Jack v Jack, above n 34, at [51] . Analysing the New Zealand Supreme Court's "Working Assumption": Is it Really Working?
chose not to employ a nanny instead deciding A would undertake such work. 135 The focus must be on the relationship's realities and its actual consequences.
C Solution
Under Scott causation would be assumed, subject to rebuttal, in traditional DOF relationships such as CRH 136 and PEL. In fact, because Scott discards "diminution" and "enhancement" awards at quantum, the two problematic categories aforementioned are eliminated altogether. 137 Although not every case employed the strict approach in the aforementioned scenarios, 139 it has been the common approach. 140 The assumption eliminates the potential for inconsistency and better achieves s 15's policy rationale by ensuring an unrealistically strict approach does not deprive deserving claimants. 135 Shaw, above n 115, at 539. 136
Rebuttal may be successful due to reasons discussed at n 106. 137
Scott 
V Striking the Correct Balance
Green explained the causation dilemma as: 141 the inherent difficulty … in achieving the correct balance between being unduly restrictive, rarely finding … disparity was as a result of the [DOF], to lowering the … bar so that the causation test is effectively meaningless.
For the reasons discussed below, amalgamating the majority's jurisdictional reasoning and the minority's apportionment reasoning best strikes this balance.
A Jurisdiction
In terms of jurisdiction, Green's statement reflects the choice between the strict approach and the broad assumption approach. The assumption's ability to resolve issues caused by the strict approach as discussed in Part IV(C), alongside the further reasons discussed below, make the majority's working assumption the better choice at jurisdiction.
Purpose of causation: text v policy
Resolving the dilemma requires analysing why the causation requirement exists. The difficulty is that its purpose is unclear with incongruity between s 15's text and policy rationale. 142
The strict "but for" requirement is certainly an available, if not the most obvious, interpretation of s 15's "because of" wording. 143 However in causation law, the "but for" test's key limitation is its potential non-application where multiple sufficient causes rational resolution". 183 Judges are capable of, and experienced in, making such assessments similar to those undertaken in contributory negligence. 184 In fact, certain aspects of Arnold J's judgment are evocative of apportionment. He conceded that personal characteristics could sometimes provide a "partial explanation" of disparity and if so, "it may be that only part of the disparity can fairly be said to result from the [DOF]". 185 His subsequent no-apportionment approach is inconsistent with these pronouncements.
C Rebuttal
The amalgamated approach is further justified as it provides a better solution to the problematic implications created by the assumption's rebuttable nature. The corollary of the assumption being a rebuttable presumption 186 is that it imports a reverse burden on B
for rebuttal. 187 Whether B's burden is evidential or legal is unclear. A legal burden would be problematic, "fit[ting] uncomfortably [with this] legislative regime" that simply requires courts "to be satisfied about a state of events which … exists". 188 It would also appear incongruous given the well-settled position that A bears no legal burden. 189 In fact, Arnold J cited X v X which disclaimed a legal burden on "any party". 190 Yet, the majority's language "suggests [the burden] is more than evidential" 191 with "little room
[allowed] for rebuttal". 192 Even an evidential burden would attract criticism. Given the issue with the strict approach was A's high evidential burden it would be ironic for the working assumption solution to remove that difficulty for A by importing it to B. Put this way, all the assumption does is shift causation from something A tried to establish to something B tries to knock down.
However, this shift is justifiable as it better reflects the usual reality in traditional DOF relationships. After all, before Scott, courts essentially worked from a different presumption: that no causal link existed absent strict evidence of the DOF's impact on earning capacity. 193 In a choice between presumptions, Scott's assumption (or presumption) is the better choice. The alternative presumption is less attractive in that it unrealistically "presume[s] a model of [relationships] in which [partners] make independent economic choices and are hence responsible for their own economic positions", rather than acting in the interests of their joint enterprise. 194 More problematically, the assumption's rebuttable nature casts doubts on its avowed purpose to remove speculative, unedifying and costly evidence previously led. O'Regan J validly queried whether it would truly "reduce the extent to which evidence is adduced by [B] ", noting that one would "expec[t] that attempts will be made to [rebut the assumption]". 195
The majority may respond to O'Regan J by noting that the high threshold dissuades frivolous rebuttal as only "compelling" 196 evidence of causes "clearly independent of the 
VI Framing the Working Assumption
A remaining issue is whether the majority correctly framed the assumption as arising in relationships conducted along traditional lines. Given "traditional lines" is likely to mean role-divisions where A undertakes primary responsibility for home-making and childcare and B for income-earning, 201 this essay agrees with the majority's idea of when the assumption should arise. However, the "traditional lines" and "non-career partner" terminology creates unnecessary confusion. We should simply say that, subject to rebuttal, in relationships where A has undertaken primary responsibility for domestic duties and B for income-earning, causation is assumed ("primary responsibility notion").
This framing is justified when the alternatives are considered. Another alternative is to consider the different role-divisions undertaken by New Zealand Again framing the assumption as against these statistical categories is unhelpful. For example, although causation was conceded in Scott, it was accepted to be a traditional DOF relationship. 204 Scott was the primary caregiver and often worked part-time.
Williams worked full-time throughout. This might incline us to say that the assumption arises in part-time/full-time relationships. But that misses the point. The reason why the assumption would arise is not by virtue of it being a part-time/full-time relationship but because Scott worked part-time so that she could undertake primary responsibility for 202 Green, above n 59, at 10. 203
Law Commission, above n 57, at 39. 204
Scott v Williams, above n 1, at [299] per Arnold J.
professional careers after protracted absences. 210 It also allowed B to continue to cultivate his earning capacity in a lucrative field unburdened by domestic duties.
What this analysis illustrates is that the focus ought to be on whether A undertook primary responsibility for domestic activities allowing B to focus on career tasks unimpeded, or less impeded than if A did not undertake these domestic responsibilities.
Focusing on whether A was unemployed, worked part-time, or full-time is unhelpful. To take the full-time/full-time example: a proposition that the assumption arises in all full- The court can then assess whether A undertook primary responsibility for domestic duties. If so, causation is assumed, subject to rebuttal, and apportionment at quantum.
Some residual injustices in terms of relativity may remain. An assumption framed to focus on the primary responsibility notion assumes causation in situations where A undertook no paid work and was fully devoted to domestic activities, in situations where A split time between the two and even in situations where A worked full-time but still undertook a greater proportion of domestic duties. The causal link is prima facie strongest in the first situation and weakest in the last. If the amalgamated approach is adopted, the apportionment exercise will ensure these differences are recognised when courts determine compensable disparity. Prima facie, in the first situation a high proportion, if not all, of the disparity will be apportioned to the DOF. In the last situation, perhaps only a small proportion of the disparity will be apportioned to the DOF given the disadvantage Moge v Moge, above n 162, at [116] . It is understandable why long-duration relationships could be singled out because "the longer the [relationship], the greater the probability of economic integration between the [partners]" in their joint enterprise. 224 However to avoid disputes as to what qualifies as sufficiently long, and given Arnold J provided the assumption's fullest exposition, it is safe to assume causation whatever the relationship's length. Similarly, a childless relationship entered later in life should not in itself disentitle a claimant from the assumption's benefits. Provided primary responsibility for other domestic duties was undertaken the assumption should still arise. However, the lesser the childcare duties or the shorter the relationship, the easier it will be for B to rebut the assumption completely or to argue for greater apportionment on the amalgamated approach. Similarly in relationships entered later in life, which are becoming increasingly common, 225 B is more able to whittle down the assumed causal link by arguing that he entered the relationship Analysing the New Zealand Supreme Court's "Working Assumption": Is it Really Working?
having already established the high earning capacity he continues to boast of postseparation. 226 The incredible diversity among relationships makes it difficult to set adequately specific prerequisites to capture relationships where the assumption should arise, while excluding those where it should not. The better approach is to set more general, fundamental requirements leaving rebuttal and apportionment exercises to ensure the strength of the causal link is fairly reflected at quantum. This is also justified because Scott does not discuss what occurs if the assumption does not arise. Is A not to have a claim? Or is the strict approach to be applied? That would be incongruous given the strong criticism of the strict approach's speculative, costly and unedifying evidential burden. The more claimants that are able to utilise the assumption's benefits of removing this evidential burden, the better. A broad assumption formulation, with a single prerequisite of A undertaking primary responsibility for domestic duties and B for income-earning, facilitates this outcome without losing its justifiable, theoretical peg. After all, research and common sense indicate that where A undertakes primary responsibility for domestic duties and B for income-earning, the assumption is not unfounded. 227 The relationship's length, when it was entered into and other relevant factors simply enhance or reduce the strength of the assumed causal link.
VII Conclusion
Section 15's laudable rationale has not translated into practical success. A strict, and now unnecessary, causation approach has been a key barrier. Thus Scott's working assumption, which eschews the strict causation approach, is a positive development in stricter "because of" wording. Furthermore, Scott's "traditional lines" and "non-career partner" terminology should be avoided in framing the assumption.
Thus, the ideal proposition is: At jurisdiction, causation is assumed in relationships where A has undertaken primary responsibility for domestic duties and B for income-earning regardless of whether A also undertook paid employment. If truly independent causes provide a complete explanation for the disparity, the assumption will be rebutted.
Otherwise, the existence of other causes in addition to the DOF, will be appropriately reflected through a broad apportionment exercise at quantum.
where the working assumptions are not displaced, the whole of the disparity should be attributable to the division of functions within the relationship.] (b) Considering for how long the disparity should be compensated. It should not be assumed that this period will be the same as the potential working life of either partner. This is because: (i) in the ordinary course, the non-career partner will be expected to undertake income-earning activities; and (ii) the career partner's personal autonomy must be recognisedhe or she must be left with the ability to move on with his or her life. It will be relevant in this context to consider how long it might take the non-career partner to re-train or up-skill, which will be affected by matters such as whether or not he or she has responsibility for the daily care of minor or dependent children of the relationship.
(c) Applying the necessary discounts to cover the contingencies of life (perhaps by reference to a New Zealand version of the Ogden Tables) and taxation.
(d) Calculating a present value for the annual figures thus derived to 15 identify a particular sum.
(e) Halving that sum, which is necessary to avoid simply transferring thefull disparity on to the career partner.
(footnotes omitted).
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